



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

MARINE FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 251

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 31

2D MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, FMF, ATLANTIC

MCAS, BEAUFORT, SOUTH CAROLINA 29904

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5750

S-3

7 Jan 1985

From: Commanding Officer, Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251
 To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code HD), Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, DC 20380
 Via: (1) Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 31 (S-3)
 (2) Commanding General, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina 28533
 (3) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia 23511
 Subj: COMMAND CHRONOLOGY; PERIOD 1 JULY 1984 THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 1984
 Ref: (a) MCO P5750.1F

SECTION I

Unit Designation

- a. Reporting Unit Code: 01251
- b. Table of Organization Number: 8849N

Period Covered and Location. At Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort, South Carolina 29904 from 1 July 1984 through 31 December 1984.

Personnel Information

- a. Commanding Officer
 LTCOL Dennis L. DOYLE 1 July 1984 - 31 December 1984
- b. Executive Officer
 MAJ Benard F. RAMEY 1 July 1984 - 31 December 1984
- c. Administrative Officer
 CAPT James R. KENNEY 1 July 1984 - 31 December 1984
- d. Intelligence Officer
 CAPT James E. HUNTER 1 July 1984 - 18 September 1984
 CAPT Randolph E. TOM 19 September 1984 - 31 December 1984
- e. Operations Officer
 MAJ Thomas V. WOLF 1 July 1984 - 31 December 1984

VMFA-251

Jules-McSey

Subj: COMMAND CHRONOLOGY; PERIOD 1 JULY 1984 THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 1984

f. Logistics Officer

CAPT John D. FROMULARO 1 July 1984 - 31 December 1984

g. Aircraft Maintenance Officer

MAJ Eddie A. DANIELS III 1 July 1984 - 14 September 1984
MAJ Frank M. SCOTT 15 September 1984 - 31 December 1984

h. Safety Manager

CAPT William F. PRATT 1 July 1984 - 18 August 1984
MAJ Ronald C. SMITH 19 August 1984 - 31 December 1984

i. Staff Historian

1STLT Howard F. BARKER 1 July 1984 - 31 December 1984

j. Sergeant Major

SGTMAJ David E. RIPLEY 1 July 1984 - 31 December 1984

Average Monthly Strength

	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USN</u>
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
July 1984	36	225	0	0
August 1984	38	225	0	0
September 1984	33	222	0	0
October 1984	33	217	0	0
November 1984	33	228	0	0
December 1984	34	223	0	0

Equipment

	<u>No/Type</u>
July 1984	12/F-4S
August 1984	10/F-4S
September 1984	10/F-4S
October 1984	10/F-4S
November 1984	11/F-4S
December 1984	13/F-4S

SECTION II

Command, Operations and Training

July kicked off with Air-to-Ground (AG) and Low Altitude Tactics Training (LATT) for the upcoming Yuma deployment. On 6 and 7 July the aircrew flew to Yuma. In Yuma low altitude tactics and bombing were the key sorties. Along

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with these sorties, were low altitude ingress and tanking sorties. The deployment ended on 26 July and all squadron aircraft and personnel returned to Beaufort on 27 through 29 July. Back home from the intense environment of Yuma, the squadron immediately became the Sopwith Camel duty squadron for August.

Moving quickly, the squadron began working up two crews for Air Combat Tactics Instructor (ACTI). Now, not only were the ACTI crews improving their Air Combat Maneuvering (ACM) skills, but the entire squadron's emphasis shifted to ACM. In mid-August five F-4S were sent to Cherry Point, NC for a TACTS/DDS deployment. At the same time the ACTI crews began their evaluation. On 25 August the DDS crews returned, and both the ACTI crews successfully completed their training. A drive safe lecture was received by all hands before the Labor Day weekend.

September brought a new month and a new training emphasis. The operations tempo was geared toward maintaining bombing proficiency and Fighter Intercepts (FI). Inclement weather slowed operations the second week of September, and on 9 September four aircraft were hurricane evacuated to Dallas, Texas. The weather improved and the hurricane passed. All aircraft flew back to Beaufort, SC on 12 September. Flying continued as normal, and to finish the month a PFT was run on 28 September.

In October the training emphasis once again changed. This time it was All Weather Intercepts (AWI) and ACM. Tasked with numerous requirements from Wing and Group, the squadron was kept extremely busy. On 2 and 3 October there was Amalgam Chief. On 15 through 21 October there was the Combined Arms Operation (CAO) and the Anti-Air Warfare Exercise (AAWEX) on 22 through 24 October. On 25 October two more crews began ACTI workups.

In November the squadron began low level intercepts over land and LATT. These sorties and an increase in aircrew proficiency helped the squadron gear up for Red Flag. On 12 through 17 November the ACTI evaluation was conducted and successfully completed for both crews. Peppered throughout the month, numerous Wing commitments were fulfilled. The final week of November involved one section per day going to Eglin AFB, FL for one night to run intercepts against the F-15's.

In December, with a missile shoot and a major deployment looming on the horizon, the squadron trained intensively in all the areas for fighter attack aircraft. The primary crews for the missile shoot were quickly brought up to speed. On 3 December through 7 December, Quickthrust, an Air Force exercise, was conducted with Deep Air Support and Combat Air Patrol being the primary missions. Also during December, four aircraft were ferried to the Military Aircraft Storage Dispatch Center (MASDC) in Tuscon, Arizona.

Personnel and Administration

A high point for Administration was its 99% Unit Diary Rate. With the continuing high tempo of administrative work they still maintained an excellent inspection and audit record.

Subj: COMMAND CHRONOLOGY; PERIOD 1 JULY 1984 THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 1984

Legal Action

The Commanding Officer, VMFA-251 is the Special Courts Martial Convening Authority for the squadron. As such, the following legal proceedings were held in this squadron:

Special Courts Martial:	1
Summary Courts Martial:	0
Non-Judicial Punishment:	9
JAG Manual Investigations:	3

Medical

During this period the squadron has been assigned a Flight Surgeon. This assignment has proven extremely beneficial in improving pilot/physician working relationships and the resultant increase in aircrew and squadron health standards.

Logistics/Supply

Logistic support for the squadron during the last 6 months has been fairly good. Supplies have been quite adequate, not only at home, but on deployment as well.

Some shortages involved procurement of aircrew gear and office machines. With all gear and supplies ordered, these items are expected to appear in the next few months.

Civic Action

Throughout the past 6 months numerous squadron tours were conducted. Most of these tours were given to local school groups and occasionally to visiting educators.

SECTION III

July 1984	VMFA-251 flew 331 sorties/434.6 hours
1-5 July 1984	LATT Training for Yuma
6-7 July 1984	Crews TRANSCON to Yuma
7-26 July 1984	Yuma AG Deployment
27-29 July 1984	RTB from Yuma
August 1984	VMFA-251 flew 239 sorties/305.3 hours
1 August 1984	Sopwith Camel for the month
2 August 1984	ACTI crews begin workup

Subj: COMMAND CHRONOLOGY; PERIOD 1JULY 1984 THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 1984

20 August 1984	Aviation Safety Briefs
20-24 August 1984	TACTS/DDS deployment
20-25 August 1984	ACTI Evaluation
30 August 1984	Drive Safe Lecture
September 1984	VMFA-251 flew 222 sorties/309.7 hours
9 September 1984	HUREVAC 4 aircraft to Dallas/fly local sorties
11 September 1984	Two more aircraft to Dallas
12 September 1984	All HUREVAC aircraft RTB
17 September 1984	Assistant Wing Commander interviews augmentees
28 September 1984	Squadron PFT
October 1984	VMFA-251 flew 295 sorties/408.1 hours
2-3 October 1984	Amalgam Chief
4 October 1984	Safety Standdown
15-21 October 1984	Combined Arms Operations
16-18 October 1984	CAS and CAP
19 October 1984	Wing Frag
21 October 1984	CAP
22-24 October 1984	Anti-Air Warfare Exercise
25 October 1984	ACTI crews begin workup
31 October 1984	Wing Frag (CAS)
November 1984	VMFA-251 flew 291 sorties/361.1 hours
12-17 November 1984	ACTI Evaluation
16 November 1984	Wing Frag (EVM)
26-28 November 1984	One aircraft per day to Eglin AFB for FI's with F-15's
29 November 1984	Wing Frag (2)
December 1984	VMFA-251 flew 252 sorties/358.3 hours
3-7 December 1984	Quickthrust

Subj: COMMAND CHRONOLOGY; PERIOD 1 JULY 1984 THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 1984

4-6 December 1984 Ferry 2 aircraft to MASDC

26-27 December 1984 Ferry 2 aircraft to MASDC

SECTION IV


Item 1.....Yuma Post Deployment Report

Item 2.....DDS After Action Report

Item 3.....CAO After Action Report

Item 4.....AAWEX After Action Report

Item 5.....Quick Thrust After Action Report


D. L. DOYLE

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251
Marine Aircraft Group 31, 23MAW, FMFlight
MCAS, Beaufort, South Carolina 29904

3120
S-3
20 Aug 1984

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Second Marine Aircraft Wing, Fleet Marine Force,
Atlantic, MCAS Cherry Point, N. C. 28533 (G-4)
Via: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 31 (S-3)
Subj: POST DEPLOYMENT REPORT: VMFA-251 YUMA DEPLOYMENT 7-29 JULY 1984

1. The following constitutes an After Action Report for the subject deployment:

PART I - SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

1. VMFA-251's Yuma deployment 7-29 July 1984 required the deployment and retrograde of 12 F-4S aircraft from MCAS Beaufort, S. C. to MCAS Yuma, Az. The objectives to be met during the deployment were:

- a. Conduct transcontinental flights utilizing KC-10 aerial refueling.
- b. Conduct low altitude training qualifications for squadron aircrew.
- c. Conduct training in air-to-ground ordnance delivery techniques with practice and live ordnance.
- d. Conduct training in Close Air Support (CAS) and Deep Air Support (DAS) missions.

PART II - DATA

1. The following data applies for the subject deployment:

- a. Deployment Site: MCAS Yuma, Az.
- b. Dates: 7-29 July 1984
- c. Number of Aircraft: 12 F-4S
- d. Number of Personnel: 36 Officers/28 SNCO's/111 Enlisted
- e. Training Objectives Achieved:
 - (1) CRP increase of 5.15%.
 - (2) KC-10 aerial refueling utilized on both the deployment and retrograde movements.
 - (3) Fourteen (14) pilots received low altitude tactics qualifications.
 - (4) Air-to-ground sorties were completed.

Subj: POST DEPLOYMENT REPORT: VMFA-251 YUMA DEPLOYMENT 7-29 JULY 1984

- f. Flight Hours: 388.5 (385.7 day/2.8 night/35.2 inst)
- g. Sorties: 293 (4 EVM/138 LATT/AG/96 NAV/AG/4 AA/7 FAE/3 PMCF/41 Ferry)
- h. Ordnance Expended:

MK-77 Firebomb	3
MK-82 General Purpose HE	451 (300 S/E fins, 151 conical fins)
MK-83 General Purpose HE	52
MK-83 Laser Guided	3
MK-76 Practice Bomb	682
BDU-45 Practice Bomb	44
M904 E2/3 Mechanical Fuse	451
MK 376 Electrical Fuse	55
MJU-8/B Decoy Flare	114
Chaff	754

i. Operating Areas: R2301L, R2507, R2512, Turtle MOA, Rakish Litter Target, Panel Stager Target, Shadetree Target, Luke N/S TAC Ranges

PART III - PROBLEM AREAS/LESSONS LEARNED

1. Operations: No significant problems were encountered in operations during this deployment. Surprisingly a few sorties were lost due to severe late afternoon thunderstorms which brought high winds, heavy rains, and blowing dust. The only significant item which needs to be addressed is the availability of MK-15 Snake-eye fins. Only three hundred were available for this deployment. Of those, one hundred ninety-four were MOD-1A or MOD-2A which are restricted to 450 kts at release and which must be released within the safe drop parameters of conical finned bombs. Valuable training can be conducted without the snake-eye fins. However, the fins are necessary to maximize such a training evolution. Every effort should be made by higher headquarters to procure an adequate number of MK-15 MOD-3/4 snake-eye fins for future training deployments.

2. Supply:

Item: Repair Component Availability at AIMD MCAS Yuma

Discussion: AIMD Yuma troubleshot major assemblies to the defective component. The non-RFI assemble then was returned to the squadron with a list of defective parts. The squadron then would have to order these defective parts from MCAS Beaufort. Once received the repair parts and higher assembly would be returned to AIMD Yuma for repair and test. These procedures significantly increased turnaround time.

Recommendation: MAG-31 and 2d MAW negotiate with MCAS Yuma to follow acceptable repair and part procurement procedures for deploying Second MAW units.

NOTE: On 17 August 1984 this unit received a telephone call from a Commander ROCKWOOD, MCAS Yuma (Avn 951-2151). Cmdr ROCKWOOD noted VMFA-251's post

ITEM 1.

Subj: POST-DEPLOYMENT REPORT: VMFA-251 YUMA DEPLOYMENT 7-29 JULY 1984

deployment critique stating that action was being taken to change Yuma's procedures concerning repairable item parts procurement for deploying units. Although some components could not be released to deploying squadrons he noted that most of the "bits and pieces" required to repair weapon replaceable assets are available and in the future would be released to AIMD to repair such assets.

Item: Transportation of Repair Parts Between Beaufort and Yuma

Discussion: Resupply for valid NMCS/PMCS documents sent by MAG-31 to Yuma took six days despite being forwarded "overnight delivery - must ride". This resulted in cannibalization actions and increased NMCS time.

Recommendation: MAG-31 utilize a different means of resupply which will provide timely and reliable transportation for supply parts.

3. Embarkation:

Item: Lack of Mobile Scales at MCAS Yuma

Discussion: MCAS Yuma does not have a mobile scale. This resulted in excessive time lost in transporting pallets to and from an available scale.

Recommendation: Unless MCAS Yuma can be prompted into purchasing mobile scales, MAG-31 units should deploy with a set. This would ensure the timely completion of the palletization of cargo and equipment.

PART IV - COMMANDER'S COMMENTS

1. The squadron deployment to MCAS Yuma was an unqualified success. All requested ordnance was expended except for one LGB and four BDU-45's. In addition to dropping 177 tons of ordnance, valuable training was received in the low altitude regime utilizing terrain features which are generally not available on the east coast.

2. The squadron achieved all pre-planned air-to-ground training goals. A net increase of 5.15% in CRP represents a sizeable gain and can be directly attributed to a superb maintenance effort by OMA and IMA personnel. This is particularly noteworthy because the high aircraft full mission capable rate was achieved while working under conditions of intense heat.

B. F. Ramey
B. F. RAMEY
Acting



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
MARINE FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON
MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 3
2D MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, FMF, ATLANTIC
MCAS, BEAUFORT, SOUTH CAROLINA 29904

IN REPLY REFER TO:
3120
S-3
25 Sep 1984

From: Commanding Officer, Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251
To: Commanding General, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic,
Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina 28533 {G-4}
Via: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 31 {S-3}
Subj: AFTER ACTION REPORT; VMFA-251 TACTS/DDS DEPLOYMENT, MCAS CHERRY POINT NC,
20-24 AUGUST 1984

Ref: {a} Wgo 3502.1

1. The following constitutes an After Action Report for the subject deployment in accordance with the reference:

PART I - COMMANDERS COMMENTS. Training accomplished on the MCAS Cherry Point Display Debriefing System {DDS} was some of the most valuable air-to-air training available. The detachment made full use of the facility to expose new aircrew to dissimilar air threat. Primary emphasis was placed on 1V1, 2V1, and 2V2 environment. The training resulted in several new crews becoming ACM qualified.

PART II - DEPLOYMENT STATISTICAL DATA:

1. The following data applies to subject deployment.

- a. MCAS Cherry Point, NC
- b. 20 August to 24 August 1984
- c. 5 F-4S
- d. 14 Officers/6 Staff Non Commissioned Officers/28 enlisted
- e. Avg CRP increase 2.26% for air-to-air sorties; ACM qualification for four new pilots; refresher for section leads.
- f. Flight Hours: Day 58.1
Night 0.0
Inst 8.3
- g. Sorties Air-to-Air 26
other 10
sorties cancelled {operations} 6 {Maintenance} 2
- h. Ordnance expended: None
- i. Area: W-72 / W-122 B/F

Subj: AFTER ACTION REPORT: VMFA-251 TACTS/DDS DEPLOYMENT, MCAS CHERRY POINT NC,
20-24 AUGUST 1984

PART III - PROBLEM AREAS/LESSONS LEARNED

1. Personnel

a. Item: Augmented MAG-31 Supply Personnel for DDS Deployment

Discussion: Supply personnel augmented to the squadron were not familiar with supply procedures for drawing LOX or Nitrogen. After the initial confusion with MCAS Cherry Point supply procedures, the supply personnel did an excellent job procuring needed supply items.

Recommendation: Provide adequate training or experienced supply personnel for the DDS deployment. One supply man should be on advance party to make liaison with the appropriate supply activities on board MCAS Cherry Point, N.C.

2. Intelligence: None.

3. Operations: None.

4. Supply

a. Item: Supply Pack-Up for DDS Deployment

Discussion: The supply pack-up for the deployment was inadequate. Limited quantities of radar clamp items made it impossible to keep FMC aircraft available for flight crews. No CAC's in the pack-up resulted in an aircraft being NMCS for 2 days. The requirement for 2 utility hydraulic pumps arose but the pack-up only had one. The inadequate pack-up resulted in lost flight hours and PMCS aircraft.

Recommendation: MAG-31 Supply should provide an adequate supply pack-up to include increased quantities of radar clamp items, high-usage electrical components and {2} hydraulic pumps. Another option is to have the exercise based at MCAS Beaufort so it can be supported by the parent supply activity.

5. Embarkation: None.

b. Maintenance

a. Item: MAG-31 Support for DDS Deployment

Discussion: GSE requirements for MAG-31 were to provide 1 NCPP-105, 2 H-levels and 4 20 ton jacks. The GSE that was provided was short by 1 NCPP-105 and 1 H-level. During the deployment the squadron had a requirement for a NCPP-105 due to the failure of a Wells unit.

Recommendation: MAG-31 GSE provide the deploying squadron with adequate quantities of GSE.

b. Item: Work Spaces in Hangar 1700, MCAS Cherry Point, N.C.

Discussion: Work spaces for the DDS deployment were inadequate. Maintenance personnel, supply pack up and squadron embarked equipment were staged in the open hanger area of the building 1700. No telephone service in the lower

ITEM 2.

Subj: . AFTER ACTION REPORT: VMFA-251 TACTS/DDS DEPLOYMENT, MCAS CHERRY POINT NC,
20-24 AUGUST 1984

Hangar area made it difficult to communicate with the ready room and supply personnel. Being in the open hangar area made it impossible to adequately secure all equipment after working hours and maintenance personnel were subjected to a continuous noise hazard.

Recommendation: The host station/MAG should provide adequate work spaces, telephone service and proper security area.


D. L. BOYLE



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

MARINE FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 251

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 31

2D MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, FMF, ATLANTIC

MCAS, BEAUFORT, SOUTH CAROLINA 29904

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3120

S-3

1 Nov 1984

From: Commanding Officer, Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251
To: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 31 (S-4)

Subj: AFTER ACTION REPORT, COMBINED ARMS OPERATION (CAO) 1-85

Ref: (a) CG 10th MAB OpOrd 1-85 (CAO 1-85)

1. In accordance with the reference, the following report is submitted:

PART I - COMMANDER'S COMMENTS. The lessons learned from CAO 1-85 were very similar to those learned in Team Work 84. This operation was definitely a good experience for this squadron's inexperienced aircrews. Our crews were exposed to extended flights to the AOA, aerial refueling, and the Marine Corps Command and Control System. The operation significantly increased the combat readiness of this squadron.

PART II - STATISTICAL DATA

1. The following data applies to the subject exercise:

- a. Date of Exercise: 15-21 October 1984
- b. Missions Fraggd: 25
- c. Missions Flown: 22
- d. Aborts: 3 (2 Airborne/1 Ground)
- e. Hours/Sorties Flown: 104.3/48 (Includes the hours/sorties for the airborne abort missions)
- f. Ordnance Expended:
 - (1) Simulated AIM-7E: 32
 - (2) Simulated AIM-9L: 27
 - (3) Simulated MK-82: 36
 - (4) MK-76: 12

PART III - PROBLEM AREAS/LESSONS LEARNED

1. Frag Order

Comments: VMFA-251 did not receive a frag order for any day's flying during the entire CAO 1-85 evolution. Without the frag order it was difficult to control and plan the flying effort required in support of the exercise.

Subj: AFTER ACTION REPORT, COMBINED ARMS OPERATION (CAO) 1-85

Squadron representatives at the TACC normally gave this unit the basic format of the frag over the telephone one hour prior to the first brief. Without squadron representatives at the TACC this unit would have been completely in the dark with regards to the day's flying schedule. This is unacceptable if we believe we are training for "real-world" operations when the luxury of a telephone will often be denied.

Recommendation: It is recommended that a timely method of relaying the daily frag order be investigated so that ordnance loading etc. can be achieved in time to meet scheduled sorties.

2. Control On Station

Comments: Due to the unavailability of a frag order it was difficult to coordinate this squadron's flying effort. The main problems stemmed from missions that were scheduled to land at MCAS Cherry Point or air refueled and assigned another mission number. Also, it was not readily apparent at the start of the exercise that the on station times did not reflect pre-mission air refueling. This resulted in aircraft arriving for their designated time on station and then being asked to air refuel resulting in a 20-30 minute delay for on station time. Once aircraft were on station there appeared to be no control of off station time. Aircraft were allowed to air refuel whenever they needed or wanted to without the TAOC being aware of the problems this created at the squadron level. Given the limited number of aircraft each squadron possesses and the resources required to meet the fragged events, hard off station times should be given to enable available assets to be turned to other missions. If the TAOC intended to keep aircraft on station for prolonged periods then new mission numbers should have been assigned after air refueling and the squadron affected should have been informed of this retasking.

Recommendation: It is recommended that hard off station times are briefed so that the flying effort can be maximized and that if these off station times are extended, it should be TAOC controlled, and the aircraft involved should be given new mission numbers and the squadron affected should be informed.


D. L. DOYLE



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

MARINE FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 251

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 31

2D MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, FMF, ATLANTIC

MCAS, BEAUFORT, SOUTH CAROLINA 29904

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3120

S-3

2 Nov 1984

From: Commanding Officer, Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251
To: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 31 (S-4)
Subj: AFTER ACTION REPORT, ANTI-AIR WARFARE EXERCISE (AAWEX) 1-85
Ref: (a) MAG-31 OPLAN (AAWEX) 1-85

1. In accordance with the reference, the following is submitted:

PART I - COMMANDER'S COMMENTS. AAWEX 1-85 provided VMFA-251 with valuable and realistic training. Several new pilots in the squadron were exposed to the Marine Corps Command and Control System and as such gained a great deal of experience.

PART II - STATISTICAL DATA

1. The following data applies to subject exercise:
 - a. Date of Exercise: 22-24 October 1984
 - b. Total Missions Fraggd: 15
 - c. Total Missions Flown: 14
 - d. Total Missions Cancelled/Reason: 1/Maintenance
 - e. Total Sorties Fraggd: 30
 - f. Total Sorties Flown: 28
 - g. Total Hours Flown: 41.0
 - h. Total Ordnance Expended:
 - (1) 15 Simulated AIM-7F
 - (2) 16 Simulated AIM-9L
 - i. Total Fuel Utilized:
 - (1) 44,076 gallons local
 - (2) 15,530 gallons airborne
 - (3) 59,606 gallons total

Subj: AFTER ACTION REPORT, ANTI-AIR WARFARE EXERCISE (AAWEX) 1-85

PART III - PROBLEM AREAS/LESSONS LEARNED

1. Visual Straight-Ins for Recovery

Comments. Recoveries to the field for visual straight-ins requires the aircraft to slow to gear speed 6-10NM from field. Tactically this exposes them to a hostile environment unnecessarily.

Recommendation. Recover aircraft to the field, maintain mutual support, and at an airspeed which provides them the ability to neutralize the threat (battle break).

2. Kill Removal

Comments. Lack of kill removal criteria leads to excessively long engagements. Realistically, fighters losses are expected and occasionally fighters should RTB, rather than return to CAP.

Recommendation. Establish kill removal criteria on at least the fighters part to evaluate shots in order that they break off the engagement and return to CAP.


D. L. BOYLE



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

MARINE FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON 251

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 31

2D MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, FMF, ATLANTIC

MCAS, BEAUFORT, SOUTH CAROLINA 29904

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3120/3

S-3

12 Dec 1984

From: Commanding Officer, Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251
To: Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 31 (S-3)

Subj: AFTER ACTION REPORT, QUICK THRUST 1-85

Ref: (a) Ninth Air Force OPLAN 1-85

1. In accordance with the reference, the following report is submitted:

PART I - COMMANDER'S COMMENTS. Quick Thrust 1-85 provided VMFA-251 with valuable and realistic training. The scenario set forth proved to be a good tool for training the younger pilots. Also, the three mission commander missions which were undertaken by us allowed several crews to be indoctrinated into the problems and coordination involved in planning and executing a multi-plane mission.

PART II - SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

1. Quick Thrust 1-85 required support from VMFA-251 consisting of 32 scheduled sorties during the week 3-7 December 1984. The objectives of our participation were:

a. To conduct squadron training in the areas of defensive CAP and offensive interdiction.

b. To conduct flight operations to meet the overall objectives of Quick Thrust 1-85.

c. To assign individual billets of mission commander in order to familiarize squadron personnel with the coordination/tactics involved in a multi-service scenario.

PART III - STATISTICAL DATA

1. The following data applies to subject exercise:

a. Date of exercise: 3-7 December 1984

b. Number of aircraft: 12 F-4S

c. Number of participating personnel: 30 Officers/150 Enlisted

d. Training objectives achieved: 14 sorties were flown in phases of interdiction and defensive CAP resulting in an increased squadron CRP.

ITEM 5.

Subj: AFTER ACTION REPORT, QUICK THRUST 1-85

e. Flight hours: 16.3 Hours

f. Sorties: 12 flown/32 scheduled resulting in a 37.5% completion rate.

g. Ordnance expended: None.

h. Operating Areas: Quick Thrust MOA.

PART III - PROBLEM AREAS/LESSONS LEARNED. No significant problems were encountered during this exercise. Twenty sorties were cancelled due largely to inclimate weather and to a lesser degree, other squadron requirements (i.e. SOPWITH CAMEL). There did however seem to be two significant items which should be addressed:

1. Item: Placement of CAPS

Discussion: The DCA missions consisted of a section aggressing a strike mission. Due to the restraints of the problem and placement of the CAPS and targets this was not able to be done successfully. The CAP aircraft were not allowed in the overwater tunnel, thus excluding the intercept from being made.

Recommendation: Place more CAPS overland nearer to the target to ensure strike aircraft look-out doctrine is tested.

2. Item: Mission Commander Coordination

Discussion: VMFA-251 had three mission commander missions usually involving coordination of up to 20 aircraft. Subordinate section leaders/division leaders should ensure that they initiate contact with the mission commander in order for the mission to run smoothly.

Recommendation: Ensure that mission commanders know well in advance, via the frag, what their mission is and who the players are. Advance knowledge of who the players are would greatly facilitate this coordination.


D. L. DOYLE